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INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM

One of the key pieces of conventional wisdom that have grown up
around the issue of international terrorism is the need for international
cooperation in combatting it. Particularly in the context of the intensified
United States Government focus on terrorism since the Reagan Administration came to power in 1981, international cooperation has been almost
a fixation of officials concerned with terrorism in both the executive and
legislative branches. In a press conference during the first month of the
new administration, Secretary of State Haig set the tone:
International terrorism will take the place of human rights, our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights. And it's time that it
be addressed with greater clarity and greater effectiveness by Western na*International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Attorney-Adviser, Office
of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The views expressed in this article are
the author's solely.
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tions and the United States as well.1

A statement later in 1981 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee fleshed out the executive branch's thinking:
As to international cooperation, it is clear that combatting international
terrorism is not a task for the United States alone. The problem is too
complex and universal to be dealt with by any one nation. We are committed to working with other nations to establish a peaceful and stable
world order, in which we may be free from the threat of political violence
2
.... [T]his administration has given a high priority to this task.
4
3
United States Government spokesmen, from the President on down,
have continued to sound this theme up to the present time. Furthermore,
legislative statements have echoed and indeed amplified this idea, particularly in the Ninety-ninth Congress. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 contained a section calling on the
President "to seek the establishment of an . . International Anti-Terrorism Committee, consisting of representatives of the member countries
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan, and such other countries as may be invited and may choose to participate." 5 The International Anti-Terrorism Committee's stated purpose was "to focus the attention and secure the cooperation of the governments and the public of
the participating countries and of other countries on the problems and
responses to international terrorism." 6 The Omnibus Diplomatic Secur-

1. Transcript of a Press Conference with the Secretary of State (Haig), January 28,
1981, reprintedin U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT

Doc-

umE.Sr
1981, at 395 (1984) [hereinafter CURRENT DOCUMENTS 1981].
2. Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Management (Kennedy) Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 10, 1981), reprinted in CURRENT DocuMENTS 1981, supra note 1, at 395, 398.
3. See, e.g., Statement by President Reagan (Kansas City, Missouri, Oct. 21, 1984)
(discussion of foreign policy issues during the campaign debate with Walter Mondale)
reprinted in U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT

DOCU-

1984, at 308 (1986) [hereinafter CURRENT DOCUMENTS 1984] ("[I]t's going to
take all the nations together [to deal with this terrorist problem], just as when we banded
together we pretty much resolved the whole problem of skyjackings sometime ago.").
4. See, e.g., Address by John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, before the
Brookings Institution Conference on Terrorism 3-4 (Washington, D.C., Dec. 10, 1986)
("[W]e must persist in our campaign to build a broad coalition, at home and abroad,
MENTs

willing to stand up against terrorism .

. .

. We encourage international cooperation in

isolating terrorist states to make it clear that costs will be imposed on those states that
support or facilitate the use of terror.").
5. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-83, § 506, 99 Stat. 190, at 222 (1985).
6. Id.
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ity and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 went further, containing an entire title
on "Multilateral Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism," a
section of which turned the previous year's exhortation to the President
regarding the formation of an "International Antiterrorism Committee"
into a directive based on findings that:
(1) international terrorism is and remains a serious threat to the peace
and security of free, democratic nations;
(2) the challenge of terrorism can only be met effectively by concerted
action on the part of all responsible nations ....
Yet behind all the rhetoric, the actual record of attempts to give substance to the ideal of international cooperation against terrorism is, as
even a casual observer will readily apprehend, rather dismal. It is a record not without its share of heroic efforts and notable achievements. In
the final analysis, however, after many years of international activity
aimed at creating some kind of effective response to terrorism, those governments that harbor terrorists or actively employ terrorism as an instrument of policy face today little prospect of a meaningful collective response from affected states.
This Article aims to contribute to an understanding of the reality and
the potential of international cooperation to combat terrorism by examining one of the most important channels through which governments have
attempted to achieve such cooperation: the Economic Summit Seven (the
Seven or the Group). Focusing in particular on the Group's work in the
area of terrorism against international civil aviation, this Article will discuss how and why the Group became involved in counterterrorism; review the Group's declarations on terrorism and their context; outline the
international background to those declarations; describe the most important single action the Group has taken to implement the declarations: the
sanctions announced against Ariana Afghan Airlines in 1981; and offer a
legal analysis of the Group's activities.
II.
A.

THE SUMMIT SEVEN DECLARATIONS

The Summit Seven and International Terrorism

As terrorism literally burst onto the international scene at the beginning of the 1970s,8 those states that felt themselves most threatened by
7. Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 701, 99 Stat.
853, at 877 (1986).
8. See E. MIcKOLus, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS,
1968-1979, at 153 et seq. (1980).
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it-including the United States-began to look for ways to secure the
international cooperation perceived to be necessary to defeat this new
menace. Quite naturally, the United Nations structure provided the
starting point for this search. This structure did in fact yield some notable achievements in the first years of the new antiterrorism effort, in
particular the conventions aimed at suppressing unlawful interference
with international civil aviation. 9
In 1972, however, it became apparent that from the perspective of the
Western governments, the role of the United Nations in international
counterterrorism cooperation would be, at best, severely limited. In that
year, responding to the upsurge in terrorist incidents, and particularly
the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, Secretary-General Waldheim undertook a special initiative to bring the issue of international terrorism before the General Assembly. 0 The United States
played a very active role in this United Nations effort; Secretary of State
Rogers gave special attention to the problem in his speech before the
twenty-seventh General Assembly in September, stating:
In short, the issue is whether the vulnerable lines of international communication . . . can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and
peoples together. All who have a stake in this have a stake in decisive
action to suppress these demented acts of terrorism."1
At the same time, the United States circulated a draft entitled "Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism," which was an attempt to establish an international regime
12
for the legal suppression of the most serious acts of terrorist violence.
But the General Assembly Resolution that emerged from that session
was unsatisfactory to the United States and many of its allies. Heavily
slanted towards justifying the legitimacy of the armed struggle of the
"national liberation movements" and condemning the "colonial, racist
and alien regimes" against which these movements were fighting, Resolution 3034 was adopted by 76 votes to 35, with 17 abstentions. The
United States and most of its allies voted against the resolution. 3 The

9. See infra Part 1IC.
10.

N.

GAL-OR,

67

DEP'T ST. BULL.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SUPPRESS

TERRORISM

83

(1985).
11.

No. 1378, at 425, 429 (1972), quoted in Bennett, U.S.

Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat InternationalTerrorism, 7

INT'L LAW.

752, 753 (1973).
12. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972).
13. G.A. Res. 3034, 27 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (2114th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/8969/L.
696 (1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 218, 220 (1972).
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subsequent work of the ad hoc Committee on International Terrorism
that Resolution 3034 established was of little more comfort to governments that looked for a strong United Nations antiterrorism stance. The
Committee was unable to agree either on the definition of terrorism, its
causes, or methods to prevent it; a fortiori, the United States draft Convention did not survive the Committee process.14
In the wake of this abortive attempt to tackle international terrorism
on a global, comprehensive basis, those states that were more interested
in achieving workable and effective counterterrorism measures than in
listening to national liberation rhetoric realized that they would have to
work through more limited fora than the United Nations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (COE) spoke frankly in
October 1972 as the direction of the current at the United Nations was
already becoming evident: "It can be concluded, therefore, that although
the [terrorism] problem is a universal one, the lack of solidarity at the
United Nations level makes it all the more necessary for coordinated action to be taken at the West European level." 5
As this statement indicates, during this period perceptions of the international terrorism problem began to change. The view of terrorism that
the aviation conventions of 1970 and 1971 implicitly reflected was that
despite its ideological element, terrorism was a common global scourge
somehow beyond normal political calculations-a sort of political public
health emergency"' that the international community as a whole needed
to combat in a neutral, workmanlike fashion. But as the United Nations
discussions on terrorism wore on, a new, more jaded perception was
emerging in some Western quarters: terrorism was seen as another in
the series of international political issues separating the democracies
from their adversaries-indeed, as a weapon that the latter used against
the former. The notion that an intractable difference of interest between
the Western democracies on the one hand and radical Third World and
socialist states on the other existed with regard to the issue of international terrorism (a conclusion difficult to avoid in the face of the experiences of Resolution 3034 and the ad hoc Committee on International
Terrorism) was already evident in certain pronouncements by Western
authorities as early as 1972 and 1973. The COE Parliamentary Assembly stated: "The resolution (3034) passed by the UN against terrorism

14. N. GAL-OR, supra note 10, at 84.
15. Report on International Terrorism, CouNs. EUR. Doc. No. 3201, at 6 (October
18, 1972), quoted in GAL-OR, supra note 10, at 209, 218-220.
16. Secretary Rogers' characterization of terrorist acts as "demented" reflects this
view perfectly. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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• . . was ineffective because more States favored terrorism and frustrated

joint international action against it . . . . , A United States official directly involved in these United Nations efforts expressed a similar view:
"[T]here were some states who did not wish to take any action at all on
this problem .

. .

. Some few of those states frankly espoused the em-

ployment of terroristic methods as a part of their revolutionary
philosophy.""
The obvious corollary was that the democracies would have to work
together to defend themselves against this new method of attack. Indeed,
during the 1970s, the major Western political "clubs"-the Council of
Europe,19 the European Economic Communities 2 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 21 came to place terrorism on their agendas with
varying degrees of seriousness. In this light, it was almost inevitable that
the issue of international terrorism would come to the attention of the
most exclusive-and in some ways the most powerful and prestigious-Western grouping of all: the Summit Seven.
Unlike the other entities mentioned above, the Summit Seven is not a
formal organization. It has no constitutive document, no written rules
and no permanent staff. In simplest terms, the leaders of the world's
seven largest industrialized democratic states-Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States-have come to observe a tradition of gathering every year
to discuss issues of mutual concern. The tradition originated in 1975,
when, upon the initiative of French President Giscard d'Estaing, the
leaders of the Seven met at Rambouilet. The perceived need for some
form of effective, top level international meeting to address critical financial and economic problems in an informal, discreet setting provided the
catalyst for the first meeting. 2 The Summit Seven meetings (Summits)
rather quickly became regularized, however, with annual rotation of the
host government, development of formal agendas, holding of periodic
preparatory meetings and issuance of joint concluding statements. By
1977, as one observer has put it, "the 'fireside era' was

. . .

definitively

17. Report on International Terrorism, supra note 15, at 2.
18. Bennett, supra note 11, at 758. Ambassador Bennett was a member of the
United States Delegation to the 27th United Nations General Assembly and represented
the United States on the Legal Committee. Id. at 752.
19. See GAL-OR, supra note 10, chapters 6-10.
20. See id. at 220-21, 327-28.
21. See id. at 75.

22. Garavoglia, From Rambouillet to Williamsburg: A Historical Assessment, in
ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND WESTERN DECISION-MAKING 5

(Merlini ed. 1984).
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23

over."
The purely economic agenda of the original Summit Seven concept
lasted little longer than its vision of an informal ambience. The 1978
Summit saw the first public foray of the Seven governments into political
issues with the Bonn Anti-Hijacking Declaration,2 4 which initiated Summit Seven counterterrorism cooperation. The Bonn Declaration emerged
spontaneously from informal discussions among the leaders themselves
during the Summit.25 Despite this almost accidental beginning, every

summit since 1978 has addressed sensitive political issues, frequently including international terrorism.2 6 Four more Group declarations on international terrorism have emerged: at Venice in 1980, Ottawa in 1981,
London in 1984, Tokyo in 1986 and again at Venice in 1987.2
B. The Declarations and Their Context
The most prominent concern of the Summit Seven governments in
their statements on international terrorism has been unlawful interference with international civil aviation: each of the Seven's declarations on
terrorism has referred to this problem either centrally or in passing. 8
The initial declaration of the Seven on terrorism issued at the Bonn
Summit in 197829 set the pattern. It began by stating the concern of the
heads of state and government about "terrorism and the taking of hostages" and declaring their intention to "intensify their joint efforts to
combat international terrorism." The joint effort that the declaration
specifically identified was the threatened imposition of an aviation boycott against any country that "refuses extradition or prosecution of those
who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such aircraft."3 "
Id. at 16.
24. See infra note 29.
23.
25.

R.

PUTNAM &

N.

BAYNE, HANGING TOGETHER: THE SEVEN-POWER SUMMITS

94 (1984).
26. See id. at 23.
27. The 1987 Summit, held in Venice, produced a sixth declaration on terrorism, reaffirming the other five (Bonn, Venice, Ottawa, London, Tokyo) declarations and condemning "all forms of terrorism, including aircraft hijackings and hostage-taking." Venice Statements on East-West Relations, Terrorism and Persian Gulf, N.Y. Times, June
10, 1987, at A10, col. 1.
28. The declarations have also addressed several other terrorism-related themes, including attacks on diplomats, hostage-taking, and abuse of diplomatic privileges and
immunities.
29. International Terrorism, 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2018, at 5 (1978) (Joint
Statement of the Heads of State and Government on International Terrorism, Bonn
Summit Meeting, July 17, 1978) [hereinafter Bonn Declaration].
30. The full text of the Bonn Declaration as reported in DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2018,
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In terms of sheer number, skyjackings had actually peaked eight years
before the Bonn Declaration. In 1970 nearly one hundred skyjackings
occurred, of which almost one-fifth were terrorist in nature. 31 Between
1970 and 1978 the annual rate of skyjackings, terrorist and otherwise,
had declined by over half. Although the number had risen sharply from
1976 to 1977, the year just prior to the Bonn Declaration, the total number of skyjackings in 1977 was less than forty, of which not more than
one-fifth were terrorist. 32
Despite the drop in overall occurrences, however, by the late 1970s,
one could hardly say that skyjackings had disappeared from the scene.
Between 1973 and 1977, skyjackings occurred at an average rate of almost three per month. 3 Moreover, the airlines of three of the Summit
Seven countries-the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany-had been among the most frequent victims
of skyjackings 3 4 In addition, two of the most sensational terrorist
skyjackings in the months preceding the Bonn Declaration had involved
aircraft of two of the summit participants, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. 35 Thus, it was not surprising that the problem of

supra note 29, is as follows:
The heads of state and government, concerned about terrorism and the taking of
hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts to combat
international terrorism.
To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those
who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such aircraft, the heads of
state and government are jointly resolved that their governments should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.
At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming
flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. The heads of state and government urge other governments to join them in
this commitment.
31. Office for Combatting Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Skyjackings 2 (1982) (hereinafter TerroristSkyjackings), reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 324 (1984) [hereinafter R. FRIEDLANDER]. For purposes of these statistics, the government defined a
"terrorist" skyjacking as "[tihe seizure of an airplane through the use or threat of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups." TerroristSkyjackings, supra, at i,
reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, supra, at 324.

32. TerroristSkyjackings, supra note 31, at 2, reprinted in R.

FRIEDLANDER,

supra

note 31, at 324.
33. Id.
34. TerroristSkyjackings, supra note 31, at 4, reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, supra
note 31, at 325.
35. In September 1977 a Japan Airlines plane was hijacked by Japanese Red Army
members in India, and Arab hijackers killed a West German pilot during a Lufthansa
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unlawful interference with international civil aviation would be on the
minds of the leaders assembled in Bonn.
In a statement issued shortly after the Bonn Summit, the United
States Government affirmed its commitment to the Bonn Declaration,
calling it "a major advance in our efforts to combat aircraft hijacking"
and noting that "[t]he seven summit participants are the major aviation
powers of the free world; their airlines carry two-thirds of the free world
passengers."3 8 And in the first public notice of what would become a
regular, if discreet, feature of Summit Seven counterterrorism work, the
United States stated: "As host government for the summit meeting, the
German Government has convened a meeting of experts in Bonn . . . to
develop specific procedures under the initiative of the Bonn declaration
to deter air hijackings."137 The German statement reporting on the results of this experts' meeting was short, to the point and utterly devoid of
detail. 8
That the Bonn Declaration itself provided insufficient guidelines for
its own implementation was clear on its face, although understandable
for a statement that heads of state and government had worked out
quickly and informally. Some reduction of its sweeping language to actual operational detail was necessary if the Seven participants were ever
to use it in practice. What would constitute "refusal" to extradite or
prosecute? What, for that matter, would constitute satisfactory extradition or prosecution? What would the offense of hijacking itself consist of
for purposes of the Bonn Declaration? How would the Bonn Declaration relate to the Hague Convention on aircraft hijacking? 9 How, operationally speaking, would the Seven make and implement the decision to
apply the Declaration to a particular country? The mandate of the experts' group was to provide answers to questions such as these.
Though the records of most of the experts' deliberations remain classified, one important result of their work is not restricted: the Guidelines
for the Application of Bonn Declaration, agreed to in London on May
9, 1979. 40 This document set out guidelines for fact-finding, evaluation

hijacking in the Mediterranean in October 1977. See id. at 19.

36. Bonn Declaration, supra note 29, at 5.
37. Id.
38. "[R]epresentatives of the seven Governments that participated in the Bonn Summit met in Bonn on August 1st and 2nd to discuss the practical implementation of the
July 17th Bonn Declaration on hijacking. They agreed on a procedure to be followed
under the Bonn Declaration in the case of a hijacking." Quoted in id.
39. See infra notes 112-123 and accompanying text.
40. Guidelines for the Application of Bonn Declaration (May 9, 1979) (a copy is
located in Department of State files).

268
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of conduct by the state concerned, determination of default, enforcement
and involvement of other states. Though it certainly did not-and one
could not expect it to-answer every operational and legal question that
the Bonn Declaration engendered,4 it did at least provide some structure
for implementing it, a structure that Summit Seven countries would rely
on for action two years later in the application of sanctions against Ariana Afghan Airlines."2
The Seven reviewed the 1978 Bonn statement on a positive note two
years later at their Venice meeting. The participants "expressed their
satisfaction at the broad support of the international community for the
principles set out in the Bonn declaration

. .

.

as well as in the interna-

tional conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation," and noted "the increasing adherence to these conventions and the
responsible attitude taken by states with respect to air-hijacking. '43 The
statement that "hijacking remains a threat to international civil aviation
and that there can be no relaxation of efforts to combat this threat" tempered this optimism. 44 Statistically, the incidence of skyjackings, terrorist
and otherwise, had remained roughly level in the two years since the
Bonn Declaration, 45 although encouraging trends in the numbers of expressions of support by non-Seven countries for the Bonn Declaration
itself4 as well as of new accessions to the international conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation had occurred. And
once again, airliners of Summit Seven countries-in this case the United
States and Italy-had been the targets of prominent terrorist hijackings

41. See infra Part IV.
42. See infra Part III.
43. Summit Statements, June 22, 1980, 80 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2041, at 7 (1980)
(statement by the Heads of State and Government on Hijacking, Venice Summit
Meeting).
44. Id.
45. TerroristSkyjackings, supra note 31, at 2, reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, supra
note 31, at 324.
46. In the year following the issuance of the Bonn Declaration, thirty-four other
states had expressed support for it; another forty-three had indicated approval of its underlying principle while stopping short of an actual expression of support for the Declaration itself. Information in Department of State files.
47. Between 1978 and 1980, over twenty-five states signed or became parties to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; the same number
signed or became parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570
[hereinafter Montreal Convention]. For discussion of these two treaties see infra Part
IIC.
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in the months prior to the summit.4
The Ottawa declaration that the following year's summit meeting issued took a very different tone. In this statement the Seven indicated
''particular concern" over "recent hijacking incidents which threatened
the safety of international civil aviation," and noted "several hijackings
which have not been resolved by certain states in conformity with their
' The most notorious of the inciobligations under international law." 49
dents to which this remark referred was the March 1981 hijacking of a
Pakistani International Airlines domestic flight to Kabul, Afghanistan by
Pakistani dissidents. This hijacking and the manner in which the Afghan
authorities had reportedly handled it appeared to the summit participants to be an appropriate occasion for the application of the sanctions
envisioned in the Bonn Declaration three years earlier. Thus, at Ottawa
the Seven announced their intention "to suspend all flights to and from
Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn Declaration unless Afghanistan immediately takes steps to comply with its obligations." 5
By 1984 the attitude of the Seven toward the aircraft hijacking threat
appeared to have changed once again, judging by the statement that the
Seven issued that year at their London summit. In the London declaration, the heads of state and government noted that "hijacking

. .

. had

declined since the Declarations of Bonn (1978), Venice (1980), and Ottawa (1981) as a result of improved security measures." Instead, newer
forms of terrorism now merited the urgent attention of the Seven.51 Indeed, although the overall annual rate of hijackings in 1982 and 1983
remained very close to what it had been for the previous nine years, the
number of terrorist 5 2 hijackings dropped to a mere two incidents in
1983; 53 in the first five months of 1984, the period just prior to the

48. In June 1979, a Serbian nationalist hijacked an American Airlines jet from the
United States to Ireland; in September 1979, Lebanese Shiite Muslims attacked an Al-

italia plane in the Middle East. See Terrorist Skyjackings, supra note 31, at 20, reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 31, at 342.
49. Statement on Terrorism, July 21, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2053, at 16
(1981) (Statement by the Heads of State and Government on Terrorism, Ottawa Summit
Meeting) [hereinafter Ottawa Declaration].
50. Id. See infra Part III for a discussion of this incident.
51. This declaration devoted particular attention to the problems of state sponsored
terrorism and abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities. Declaration on International Terrorism, June 9, 1984, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2089, at 4 (1984) (Declaration
of the Heads of State and Government on International Terrorism, London Summit
Meeting).
52. See Terrorist Skyjackings, supra note 31, at i, reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER,
supra note 31, at 324.
53.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, OF-
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London summit, only eight hijackings occurred in all." Not only did this
represent an annual rate well below that of previous years, but, of these
eight, only one appeared to be terrorist. Further, fewer and fewer hijackers were getting away; in each of the eight hijackings between January
and May 1984, responsible authorities took all the hijackers into custody
immediately after the incident. 5 Thus, at the time there did appear to be
some basis for the guarded optimism expressed in the London Declaration with regard to aviation terrorism.5
This relatively favorable situation changed drastically within a short
time. The period between the issuance of the London declaration and the
May 1986 Tokyo summit saw a series of terrorist skyjacking spectaculars, most directed at airlines or nationals of Summit Seven countries or
both, and most ending with the hijackers eluding justice: the July 1984
hijacking of an Air France plane to Tehran;" the December 1984 hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airlines jet to Tehran, during which the hijackers
murdered two United States nationals; 58 the June 1985 hijacking of a
TWA flight ending in Beirut, in the course of which the hijackers murdered one United States passenger and held thirty-nine passengers and
crew hostage in Beirut for seventeen days;59 and the hijacking of an
Egyptair jetliner to Malta in November 1985, during which the hijackers singled out and shot several American as well as Israeli passengers.6
Despite this background, the 1986 Tokyo summit declaration on terrorism referred only briefly to the problem of terrorist attacks on civil
aviation. The declaration is noteworthy in this context, however, because
it reflects the first sign of expansion of the Seven's attention to aircraft
sabotage, though only implicitly: "We agree to make the 1978 Bonn
Declaration more effective in dealing with allforms of terrorism affecting civil aviation."'

FICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY,

U.S.

AND FOREIGN REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

98-118 (1985).
54. Id. at 118-20.
55. Id. at 118-120.
56. See also CURRENT DOCUMENTS 1984, supra note 3, at 308 (statement of President Reagan).
HIJACKINGS

57.
58.

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM:

1984, at 26 (1985).

Id. at 28.

59. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1985, at 19 (1986)
[hereinafter PATTERNS: 1985].
60. Id. at 12. This incident came to a tragic close when Egyptian commandos
stormed the airplane, killing some sixty people.

61. Summit Statement on Terrorism, May 5, 1986, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2112,
at 5 (1986) (emphasis added) (Statement of the Heads of State and Government on Terrorism, Tokyo Summit Meeting).
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Though aircraft sabotage, like hijacking, had been the subject of an
international convention in the early 1970's, 2 the Seven had never paid
it any public attention before 1986. Aircraft sabotage was much rarer
than hijacking;6" because of the inherently brief duration of the incident
itself, it usually received less attention when it did occur and, unlike
hijackings, there were no visible perpetrators to deal with at the conclusion of the incident. Nonetheless, a few particularly horrifying sabotage
incidents in the months preceding the Tokyo summit evidently helped
push this issue onto the summit's terrorism agenda. These incidents include the separate but possibly linked June 23, 1985 bombings of an Air
India plane over the North Atlantic that killed all 329 passengers and
crew and of a CPAir (Canadian) plane having just landed in Tokyo that
resulted in the deaths of two baggage handlers," as well as the April
1986 explosion aboard a TWA flight over the Mediterranean that killed
four United States passengers.65
C. The InternationalBackground
The Seven's statements and actions on unlawful interference with international civil aviation between 1978 and 1986 did not, of course, take
place in a vacuum. The international community, both prior to and during the time of the Seven's attention to this issue, had taken several steps
aimed at combatting terrorism directed against aircraft, and one can only
properly appreciate the Seven's efforts in this wider context.
The stunning outburst of terrorist attacks on civil aviation in the fall
of 19706 had brought a swift and substantial legal response from the
international community: on December 16, 1970, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention) was
concluded at the Hague.67 The Hague Convention defined the offense of
unlawful seizure of aircraft, obligated parties to establish criminal jurisdiction over the offense when committed under specified jurisdictional
62.

See infra Part 11C.

63. The government recorded 684 skyjacking attempts between January 1968 and
July 1982, Terrorist Skyjackings, supra note 31, at 1, reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER,
supra note 31, at 324. During the same period records show a total of 53 explosions
aboard aircraft, not all of which one would classify as sabotage. See infra note 82. U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF CIVIL
AVIATION SECURITY, EXPLOSIONS ABOARD AIRCRAFT 4-11 (1985).
64. PATTERNS: 1985, supra note 59, at 37.
65. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6.

66. See Bell, The U.S. Response to Terrorism Against InternationalCivil Aviation,
19 ORBIS 1326, 1332 (1975-76).
67. Hague Convention, supra note 47.
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circumstances68 and established with regard to the offense the aut
dedere, aut judicare requirement 9 which was to become the foundation
of all similar future international legal efforts pertaining to various categories of terrorist offenses.7
This tremendous achievement was not written on a blank slate. The
preceding year had seen a series of steps in the United Nations and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency
of the United Nations, indicating a drastically heightened international
sensitivity to the issue of unlawful interference with civil aviation. In
December 1969 the General Assembly had adopted, by 77 to 2 with 17
abstentions, a resolution on "Forcible Diversion of Civil Aircraft in
Flight, '7 1 that called upon states "to take every appropriate measure to

68. In essence limiting the Convention's application to cases wherein "the place of
take-off or the place of actual landing of the aircraft on board which the offense is committed is situated outside the territory of the State of registration of that aircraft[.]" Id.
art. 3(3).
69. "The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether
or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in
the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law
of that State." Id. art. 7.
70. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4,
1979, 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Oct. 26, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979); and Montreal Convention, supra note 47. In
the area of skyjacking itself, the earlier Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention], completed in Tokyo was-as the conclusion of the Hague
Convention underlined-of limited potential value. Its substantive scope was broad, covering, as its title indicated, all penal offenses and hazardous acts committed on board civil
aircraft. Tokyo Convention, supra, art. 1(1). Moreover, unlike the Hague Convention it
was permissive rather than mandatory, merely authorizing States to exercise jurisdiction
over the relevant acts committed on board aircraft outside the territory of any State.
Tokyo Convention, supra, art. 1(2). See also Bell, supra note 66, at 1331. The one
provision of the Tokyo Convention that was of direct relevance to skyjacking was article
11, which obligated parties to "take all appropriate measures to restore control of the
[hijacked] aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft," to
"permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable," and to
"return the aircraft and cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession." The Hague
Convention incorporated all these requirements in somewhat strengthened form. Hague
Convention, supra note 47, art. 9.
71. G.A. Res. 2551, 24 U.N. GAOR (1831st plenary mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2551 (1970).
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ensure that their respective national legislations provide an adequate
framework for effective legal measures against all kinds of acts of unlawful interference with, seizure of, or other wrongful exercise of control by
force or threat thereof over civil aircraft in flight;" urged states "in particular to ensure that persons on board who perpetrate such acts are
prosecuted;" and urged "full support" for ICAO efforts toward "the
speedy preparation and implementation" of the instrument that would
become the Hague Convention. In the summer of 1970 ICAO convened
an Extraordinary Assembly which adopted twenty-four resolutions concerning various aspects of aviation security and unlawful interference
with aircraft. 2 One of these resolutions noted the "urgent need for an
international convention as a means of dealing more effectively with the
unlawful seizure of aircraft" and called upon states attending the ICAO
diplomatic conference scheduled for December of that year "to make
every reasonable effort. . . to agree on a convention based on the draft
convention" that the ICAO Legal Committee had prepared and approved earlier in the year."' On the eve of the ICAO conference, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted, by 105 to 0 with 8 abstentions, a resolution on "Aerial Hijacking or Interference with Civil Air
Travel" condemning "without exception whatsoever, all acts of aerial
hijacking or other interference with civil air travel . . . through the use
or threat of force" and strongly supporting the ongoing ICAO efforts to
create legal mechanisms to suppress skyjacking.7
Thus, the Hague Convention was the fruit of a series of initiatives in
the relevant international bodies that had prepared the way for its conclusion generally as well as specifically. This series of initiatives was not
directed exclusively at the adoption of an international convention, butparticularly in the ICAO context-covered several different aspects of
civil aviation security, including strengthened airport security and improved security measures aboard aircraft in flight. 5 One aspect of
ICAO's work in the period leading up to the Hague Convention is of
particular interest in the context of the current discussion. A resolution
that the ICAO Council (Council) adopted on October 1, 1970 called

72. ICAO Resolutions A17-1 through A17-24, June 16-30, 1970, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 1275 (1970).
73. Resolution A17-3, 9 I.L.M. 1276 (1970); Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, ICAO Doe. 8865, LC/159, March 16, 1970, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 669

(1970).
74. G.A. Res. 2645, 25 U.N. GAOR (1914th plenary mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2645 (1970).
75. See, e.g., ICAO Resolutions A17-10 through A17-13, A17-17, A17-18, supra
note 72.
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upon member states:
in order to ensure the safety and security of international civil air transport, upon request of a Contracting State to consult together immediately
with a view to deciding what joint action should be undertaken, in accordance with international law, without excluding measures such as the suspension of international civil air transport services to and from any
State which after the unlawful seizure of an aircraft, detains passengers,

crew or aircraft contrary to the principles of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes, or any State which, contrary
to the principle of Articles 7 and 8 of the Draft Convention on Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, fails to extradite or prosecute persons76committing acts
of unlawful seizure for international blackmail purposes.
The resolution directed the ICAO Legal Committee (Legal Committee)
to consider "an international convention or other international instruments" to "give effect to the purposes" of the paragraph set out above.7
Although the Legal Committee's work pursuant to the resolution would
ultimately fall short of this goal, the resolution gave official expression to
the concept of an international civil aviation boycott against a state that
failed to honor its international obligations regarding handling of the aftermath of a skyjacking incident-the concept that would provide, eight
years later, the basis for the Bonn Declaration.
Within the ICAO framework itself, however, expressing this concept
would prove easier than translating it into practice. The Legal Committee's work in response to the October 1970 Council resolution initially
centered around a United States draft proposal for a convention to provide for mandatory joint action against a state that a fact-finding commission determined had failed to extradite a hijacker found within its
territory or to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Such joint action could include suspension of all international aviation to and from the defaulting state.78 But in its work
over the next three years on the United States draft as well as on other
proposals to establish international machinery to promote enforcement of
obligations concerning skyjacking,79 the ICAO Legal Committee was un76. ICAO Doc. 8923-C/998, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1286 (1970) (emphasis added).
See also Tokyo Convention, supra note 70, art. 11; Draft Convention on Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 73, arts. 7, 8. The article numbers remained the same in
the final text of the Hague Convention. Hague Convention, supra note 47.
77. ICAO Doc. 8923-C/998, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1286 (1970).
78. See Chamberlain, Collective Suspension of Air Services With States Which Harbour Hijackers, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 616, 618 (1983).
79. These included a joint United Kingdom-Swiss proposal to amend the Convention
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), December 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
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able to agree on any new measures. The ICAO Conference held in
Rome in 1973 to consider several of these proposals also ended in failure, plagued by the same sorts of philosophical divisions that had undermined other United Nations efforts to grapple with the issue of
terrorism.8 0
Nevertheless, the early 1970s did see one other notable success in
ICAO's work against unlawful interference with civil aviation: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, concluded at Montreal on September 23, 1971.81 Its aut
dedere, aut judicare structure was like that of the Hague Convention;
instead of unlawful seizure of aircraft, however, the Montreal Convention dealt with various unlawful acts that would endanger the safety of
an aircraft in flight."2 Like the Hague Convention, the framers of the
Montreal Convention were responding to an escalation of the relevant
type of terrorist violence, in particular the bombings of Austrian and
Swiss airliners the previous year.83
III.

IMPLEMENTATION: THE ARIANA SANCTIONS

A. The PIA Hijacking
On March 2, 1981, Pakistani political dissidents hijacked to Kabul,
Afghanistan a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) jet on a domestic
flight from Karachi to Peshawar." The hijackers demanded the release
of political prisoners held in Pakistani prisons. Negotiations between the
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, to provide the ICAO Council with the power to determine that a
Contracting State had violated its obligations concerning the handling of a skyjacking or
aircraft sabotage incident and consequently to require all Contracting States to deny access to their airspace to any airline of the defaulting state, and a French proposal to
amend the Chicago Convention to incorporate into it the substantive provisions of the
Hague Convention without providing any provisions for new enforcement sanctions. See
also Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 622-23.
80. See supra part IIA; Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 625-26; Bell, supra note 66,
at 1337-38.
81. Montreal Convention, supra note 47.
82. Including "performfing] an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft
in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; . . . destroy[ing] an
aircraft in service or caus[ing] damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of
flight or which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or . . . plac[ing] or caus[ing] to
be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which
is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of
flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight ... .
Montreal Convention, supra note 47, art. 1(1).
83. See Bell, supra note 66, at 1333-34.
84. N.Y. Times, March 3, 1981, at A5, col. 6.
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hijackers, holding the seized aircraft with 115 hostages aboard, and authorities on the ground in Kabul (including a Pakistani delegation) were
still underway five days later when the hijackers shot and killed a Pakistani diplomat who had been a passenger.8 5 Two days later the three
hijackers, with more than 100 hostages aboard, forced the pilot to fly to
Damascus, Syria, where negotiations continued.8 6 Finally, on March 12
the hijacking ended peacefully in Damascus, with Pakistan agreeing to
free all fifty-five political prisoners as the hijackers demanded and the
hijackers freeing all hostages aboard the seized jet." As part of the deal
that ended the hijacking, Syria agreed, at the request of the Pakistani
Government, to provide temporary asylum to the hijackers and to receive
the prisoners being released from Pakistani prisons.,
This hijacking incident spawned bitter accusations, denials and
counteraccusations on the part of the two states most directly involved as
well as the two superpowers. Five days into the incident, the United
States charged that the Soviets had so far made "no apparent effort" to
resolve the situation and called upon the Soviets to "use their influence
in Kabul to achieve an early release of the passengers and crew and a
peaceful end to the incident." 89 The next day the Soviet Union labelled
the United States statement "absurd," defending the actions of the Afghan authorities in handling the hijacking and accusing the Pakistani
authorities of "delaying, maneuvering, [and] marking time." 90 On the
same day, the Afghan Government released the contents of a message it
had sent to United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim, asserting that
"the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in conformity with the international civil aviation convention and the responsibilities emanating from
it, has made unreserved efforts to maintain the safety and life of the
passengers and crews on board the Pakistani hijacked plane at the Kabul
international airport and to obtain their release" and declaring that Afghanistan would "hold the government of Pakistan fully responsible for
its delaying tactics if the lives of the passengers and the crews on board

85. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1981, at A3, col. 1.
86. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
87. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
88. N.Y. Times, March 15, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
89. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1981, at A3, col. 4. The Soviets, with 85,000 troops in
Afghanistan at that time, were generally regarded as the power behind the Afghan Government. Id.
90. "Absurd" U.S. Statement on Responsibility over Hijacked Pakistani Aircraft
(Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union broadcast, Mar. 8, 1981), reprinted in BBC
report at SU/6669/AV2 (Mar. 10, 1981) (transcript on file in office of Geoffrey Levitt).
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are endangered."9 1
The Pakistanis were not sitting passively in the midst of this verbal
crossfire. On March 8 the chairman of PIA (who was also the Defense
Minister of Pakistan) asserted that the hijackers in Kabul had been provided with "all sorts of facilities from the outside." The PIA chairman
remarked pointedly that "this was the first instance in the history of
hijacking that the hijackers were still active and energetic both physically
and mentally even seven days after a hijacking," and that "it is also
amazing that three [hijackers] are managing to keep a constant watch on
115 people without any help."9 2
Afghanistan responded heatedly to Pakistani allegations of complicity
with the hijackers. In a March 8 statement the Afghan Government declared that it "resolutely rejects the allegations that the Kabul authorities
have links with the hijackers," and added:
It must be stated decisively that all responsibility concerning the hijacking
of the plane rests in every way upon the shoulders of the government of
Pakistan and its relevant authorities. These authorities, ignoring the civil
aviation regulations, did not take appropriate measures to prevent the hi93
jackers boarding the plane with weapons and explosives.
But Pakistan reiterated and intensified its accusations following the
conclusion of the hijacking. In a television address a few days after the
hijacking ended President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq alleged there was a
deep conspiracy between the Kabul regime and Pakistani dissidents, and
that the Afghans had provided the hijackers with weapons.9 4 The United
States also renewed its complaints about Soviet behavior in connection
with the hijacking. A State Department spokesman said: "I don't see
how the Soviets can entirely escape responsibility for what took place."
The United States also charged that the hijackers had been given the
weapons while on 'the ground in Kabul. 5 The Soviets rejected the
charges, accusing the United States Government of trying to "make

91. Afghan Foreign Minister's Message to U.N. Secretary General (Bakhtar news
agency broadcast, Mar. 8, 1981), reprinted in BBC report at FE/6668/C/10 (Mar. 9,
1981) (transcript on file in office of Geoffrey Levitt).

92. Pakistani Spokesmen Repeat Allegations of Kabul's Assistance to Hijackers
(Karachi home service broadcast, Mar. 8, 1981), reprinted in BBC report at FE/6669/
C/3 (Mar. 10, 1981) (transcript on file in office of Geoffrey Levitt).

93. Afghan Government Statement: Pakistani Allegations Rejected (Kabul home
service broadcast, Mar. 8, 1981), reprinted in BBC report at FE/6669/C/6 (Mar. 10,
1981) (transcript on file in office of Geoffrey Levitt).
94. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1981, at A8, col. 6.
95. Wash. Post, March 17, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
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propaganda mileage out of this human tragedy." 9
Late the following month, the New York Times reported that the hijackers had gone to Kabul.97 Shortly thereafter Pakistan made a formal
demand, citing the Hague98 and Montreal 9 Conventions, that Afghanistan "hand over to it immediately and unconditionally the three Pakistani hijackers." 00 Afghanistan did not hand over the hijackers, but a few
weeks later, Pakistani authorities announced that they had apprehended
one of the three hijackers near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.1 01
B. The Sanctions
The Summit Seven governments thus had these circumstances before
them in considering the application of Bonn Declaration sanctions
against the Afghan airline, Ariana, at the Ottawa summit meeting in
July 1981: two of the three hijackers of the PIA aircraft still residing in
Afghanistan despite a formal Pakistani request for their extradition,
with strong lingering overtones of Afghan (and Soviet) abetment of the
hijacking itself. Against this backdrop, the Seven issued a statement declaring in relevant part:
The Heads of State and Government are convinced that, in the case of the
hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft in March, the conduct of the Babrak Karmal government of Afghanistan, both during the
incident and subsequently in giving refuge to the hijackers, was and is in
flagrant breach of its international obligations under the Hague Convention to which Afghanistan is a party, and constitutes a serious threat to air
safety. Consequently the Heads of State and Government propose to suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn
Declaration unless Afghanistan immediately takes steps to comply with its
obligations. Furthermore, they call upon all states which share their concern for air safety to take appropriate action to persuade Afghanistan to
honor its obligations.10 2
The Seven implemented this threat on November 30 when they issued
the following statement:

96.

id.

97. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1981, sec. 1, at 11, col. 1.
98. Hague Convention, supra note 47.
99. Montreal Convention, supra note 47.
100. The Times (London), May 19, 1981, at 9, col. 6.
101. PIA Hijacker'sAssociate Nabbed Near Afghan Border (Karachi Domestic Service broadcast, June 13, 1981), reprintedin 8 Foreign Broadcast Information report No.
BK131023, at F3 (June 16, 1981) (transcript on file in office of Geoffrey Levitt).
102. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 49.
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The Heads of State and Government of the seven economic Summit countries declared at Ottawa on July 20, 1981 that they proposed to suspend
all flights to and from Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn Declaration unless the Babrak Karmal regime took immediate steps to comply
with Afghanistan's international obligations by extraditing or prosecuting
under the Hague Convention the hijackers of the PIA aircraft. The statement of the seven was communicated to the Mission of Afghanistan to the
United Nations by Canada on behalf of the seven. Since no reply has been
received from the Kabul regime, France, the FRG and the UK, which are
the only countries among the seven to whose territories Ariana Afghan
Airlines fly, have decided in agreement with the other members of the
Seven to denounce their air services agreements or arrangements with Afghanistan. Notice to this effect will be given.'0 3
The Afghan Government did, however, eventually respond to the
Seven at the United Nations. In a note it delivered to the United States
Mission' on October 28, 1982, the Afghan Mission stated:
The Government, according to the decision of the Council of Ministers of
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and in compliance with and
honour of its international obligation with regards to hijackers, assures
that whenever the hijackers of Pakistan International Airlines enter Afghanistan, they will be arrested and prosecuted.
Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing undertakings, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan respectfully requests that all sanctions imposed or
contemplated against it and its national airline be terminated."0 '
This Afghan submission, which incorporated an implicit claim that the
hijackers were no longer in Afghanistan and that, consequently, Afghan
authorities could not undertake legal action against them, did not cause
the Seven to relent; the Seven duly terminated civil aviation links between themselves and Afghanistan in accordance with the November 30,
1981 statement after the notice of termination periods pursuant to the
relevant bilateral agreements (of the Seven, three-the Federal Republic
of Germany, France and the United Kingdom-had air services agreements with Afghanistan) had elapsed. Shortly before the severance took
effect, Ariana approached several other Western European countries in
an attempt to obtain alternative traffic rights, but no countries granted

103. Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 628.
104. Presumably the missions of the other Summit Seven states received the same
note as well, although no record of this is currently available.
105. Department of State Cable No. USUN 3081 (October 28, 1982) (information
in Department of State files).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 20:259

such rights and Ariana flights to Western Europe ceased entirelyY °°
In early December 1982 the president of Ariana condemned the boycott, claiming that Afghanistan had respected its international commitments in- connection with the PIA hijacking and had so informed the
Seven. He expressed the hope that the Seven'would review their decision
"because Afghanistan is a landlocked country and therefore no international regulations allow the closure of international civil air spaces and
their airports to the flights of its aeroplanes," and complained (not without some basis) that many other incidents of hijacking had taken place
without the Seven applying ensuing sanctions against any involved
countries.1 0o
In mid-1984 Kabul Radio reported that one of the three PIA hijackers
had been executed in Kabul on a conviction of murder unrelated to the
PIA hijacking. 0 ' If true, 0 9 the report would indicate that only one of
the three PIA hijackers remained alive and at large at that time. 110 In
any event, the Bonn Declaration sanctions remained in effect until 1986,
when the Seven, evidently concluding that they had achieved their purpose, quietly ended them.1 11
IV.

DISCUSSION

The Hague and Montreal Conventions represented significant advances in international cooperation against air terrorism. They effectively established the main forms of terrorist assault against civil aviation
as international crimes and stipulated clear requirements for states in
dealing with the perpetrators of such assaults. The two conventions are
now among the most widely subscribed treaties in existence; the vast majority of the world's states are parties to both of them. 1 2
The conventions, however, were in themselves insufficient to make
real headway against the threat of unlawful interference. As long as even
a few states were willing and able to provide skyjackers and saboteurs
sanctuary from justice (and sometimes still more active support), these
106. Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 628.
107. Afghan Airline Chief Condemns Western Boycott of Ariana Flights (Bakhtar
radio broadcast, Dec. 3, 1982), reprinted in BBC report at FE/2000/C/1 (Dec. 4,
1982) (transcript on file in office of Geoffrey Levitt).
108. Hijacker Executed in Kabul, The Times (London), July 14, 1984, at 4, col. 5.
109. The report was disputed by Afghan exiles in Pakistan. Kabul Plans to Resume
London, Paris,Frankfurt Flights, Reuters North Eur. Service (Nov. 7, 1986).
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
111. Reuters, supra note 109.
112. The Hague Convention has 130 parties as of this writing and the Montreal
Convention has 131 parties.
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terrorists could continue to prey upon international civil aviation with
impunity. Only through some effective mechanism to back up the aviation conventions' aut dedere, aut judicare requirements with serious
sanctions against violating states could the conventions begin to provide
real protection against air terrorism. The possibility of prosecution might
or might not deter the terrorists; nevertheless, governments inclined to
shelter them presumably would care about the threat of having their
country's aviation links with the rest of the world cut off.
As recounted above, however, the search for such an enforcement
mechanism within ICAO failed. It was into the gap left by this failure
that the Summit Seven-together, the predominant aviation powers of
the non-communist world, as well as the predominant targets of air terrorism' 1 3-stepped when, in 1978, they issued the Bonn Declaration. 1 4
In doing so, the Seven created the potential for serious sanctions against
states that failed to take meaningful law enforcement measures against
hijackers. They also created, however, a number of unresolved legal
questions that may still haunt their efforts to implement such sanctions.
An initial question pertains to the relationship of the Bonn Declaration to the Hague Convention itself. The defaults to which the Declaration refers ("refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do1" 5 not return such aircraft") are essentially
congruent with the relevant Convention obligations, found in article 7
("The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged . . . to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution") and
article 9(2) ("any Contracting State in which the [hijacked] aircraft is
found . . . shall without delay return the aircraft . . . to the persons
lawfully entitled to possession"). The declarants may have had the Convention in mind when framing the Declaration, but the Declaration does
not link the defaults that trigger its sanctions to actual violations of the
Convention; indeed, it does not mention the Convention at all. Nor does
it include jurisdictional limitations like those one finds in the Convention; on its face, therefore, it might apply, unlike the Convention, to
hijackings of state aircraft or purely domestic hijackings." 6
113.

See supra Part IIB.

114. See Bonn Declaration, supra note 29.
115. The obligation to return a hijacked aircraft goes to the state wherein the aircraft
is found, however, not to those who hijack it; thus this word probably should be "does".
116. Hague Convention, supra note 47, art. 3, paras. 2, 3, provide as follows:
2. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police
services.
3. This Convention shall apply only if the place of take-off or the place of actual
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From the viewpoint of a strong counterterrorism policy, the independence of the Bonn Declaration from the Hague Convention makes sense.
If states could continue to provide sanctuary to hijackers with impunity
simply by refraining from joining the Hague Convention, it would leave
the structure of international protection against air terrorism with a gaping hole indeed. But perhaps international law requires that such a hole
exist: after all, can a state be bound by a treaty obligation that it did not
assume? For a justifiable charge of violation of legal obligations against a
nonparty to the Hague Convention that failed to extradite or prosecute
an alleged hijacker, the aut dedere, aut judicare requirement would
have to have acquired the status of a customary international legal obligation, or some other treaty source for this requirement would have to
exist.
Scholars have been of various opinions as to the obligations of a state
under customary international law with regard to alleged hijackers found
in its territory. One observer writing in 1980 asserted that providing
sanctuary to a skyjacker is not merely a violation of a norm of customary
international law, but of jus cogens.117 But another analyst writing
shortly thereafter stated flatly: "It is not possible to say at this stage in
the development of international law that the actions which trigger the
[Bonn] Declaration sanctions are prohibited under customary international law." 11 8
Indeed, valid, legal considerations that would prevent a state not a
party to the Hague Convention from extraditing or prosecuting an alleged offender may exist." 9 It would be hard, therefore, to disagree with
the second writer quoted above. Accepting this view, however, does not
mean admitting that one can never lawfully apply the Bonn Declaration
against a nonparty to the Hague Convention. The Declaration is not a
landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is committed is situated outside
the territory of the state of registration of that aircraft...
For discussion of this point see Busuttil, The Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: A Non-Binding InternationalAgreement on Aircraft Hijacking, 31 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 474, 476 (1982).

117. Comment, Skyjacking and the Bonn Declarationof 1978: Sanctions Applicable to RecalcitrantNations, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 123, 146 (1980).
118.

Busuttil, supra note 116, at 480. See also Schwenk, The Bonn Declaration on
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 307, 312-13 (1979) ("[Ilt seems . . . doubtful
that the prosecution or extradition of hijackers can be regarded as mandatory under customary international law.").
119. "There may be no relevant extradition treaty to enable the State concerned to
accede to a request for extradition, there may be insufficient evidence to justify a prosecution or the State concerned may simply have no jurisdiction over the offence, particularly
if the offence took place outside its territory." Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 630.

Hijacking, 4
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treaty,12 ° and to parse its terms too literally would be inappropriate. Although its operative words refer simply to a refusal to extradite or prosecute as a trigger for the sanctions contemplated, the drafters linked these
words to the preceding paragraph of the Declaration which states that
the Seven governments "will intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism."1 2 Thus, the Declaration intends not to impose sanctions mechanically against any state that fails to extradite or prosecute a
hijacker, but to establish a basis for joint action against states that provide sanctuary to terrorist skyjackers. 122 In that light, when assessing the
legality of applying the Declaration to states not party to the Hague
Convention, it would be more useful to frame the question in terms of
whether there is a negative obligation under customary international law
to refrain from providing sanctuary to hijackers rather than the narrower focus on a positive obligation to extradite or prosecute. As one
writer has usefully posed the issue:
[T]here is a considerable difference between failure to extradite or prosecute on . . . technical grounds and a systematic failure to do so in cases
where there is adequate machinery under the municipal law of the State
concerned and that State, for reasons which are largely political, refuses to
it is submitted that that State is
deal with the offenders. In the latter case,1 23
in breach of its international obligations.
Another treaty, the Chicago Convention1 24 provides a second route for
imposing on nonparties to the Hague Convention a legal obligation to
refrain from providing sanctuary to terrorist hijackers. Though that convention contains no language directly referring to treatment of hijackers
or to unlawful interference with civil aviation at all, it does explicitly
incorporate the fundamental principle of safety of civil aviation. 25 As
skyjacking clearly threatens that principle, one can argue that a state
that abets such behavior by shielding skyjackers from justice is acting in
violation of a basic Chicago Convention norm.126 The utility of deriving
120. For a discussion of the legal status of the Bonn Declaration see Busuttil, supra
note 116.
121. Bonn Declaration, supra note 29.
122. See Comment, supra note 117, at 140-41.
123. Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 630.
124. Chicago Convention, supra note 79.
125. Id. at preamble, art. 44.
126. See Schwenk, supra note 118, at 314: "Hijacking and its indirect support by a
member State of ICAO is such a severe threat to the safety of international civil aviation
that it must be considered a breach of the Chicago Convention;" and Chamberlain,
supra note 78, at 631: "[A]ny State which permits its territory to become a safe haven
for hijackers creates a severe threat to the safety of international civil aviation and conse-
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such an obligation from the Chicago Convention relates to the fact that a
significantly greater number of states are parties to that treaty than to
the Hague Convention, notwithstanding the very wide acceptance of the
latter instrument.

127

At this point one might ask: for the purpose of applying Bonn Declaration sanctions to a country that shields hijackers, does it matter
whether that country is technically in breach of a legal obligation-whether derived from customary international law, the Chicago
Convention, or the Hague Convention hself-in so doing? The answer is
that Bonn Declaration sanctions have their own legal consequences, and
so must themselves have some independent legal justification. In particular, "initiat[ing] action to halt all incoming flights from [the defaulting]
country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned" 128
can itself constitute a violation of the Chicago Convention, the related
Transit Agreement, 129 and any bilateral air services agreements insofar
as these instruments give the airlines of the defaulting state the right to
conduct flights to, through or over the states imposing the sanctions.1 30
To justify taking such action, therefore, the Bonn Declaration states
must be prepared to invoke a legal principle that would support the termination or suspension of existing air service rights belonging to the defaulting state. Such a principle must in turn rest on the target state's
violation of a legal norm to which that state is subject-a norm whose
source, of course, one must find outside the Bonn Declaration itself, since
it has no legal force1"1 and, even if it did, could not create any obligations for states that have not explicitly accepted its terms. 32 Only the
imputation of a sufficiently serious violation of a state's obligation to act
in accordance with the norms regarding legal treatment of skyjackers
contained in or derived from the Hague Convention, customary international law or the Chicago Convention or both, can give rise to a corresponding right on the part of the states imposing sanctions to suspend or
terminate the target state's existing aviation rights in a manner inconsistent with the otherwise applicable terms of the instruments creating such

quently is in fundamental breach of its obligations under the Chicago Convention."
127. There are currently 157 parties to the Chicago Convention compared to 130
parties to the Hague Convention.
128. Bonn Declaration, supra note 29.
129. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, EAS
No. 487.
130. See Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 630; Busuttil, supra note 116, at 480-81.
131. See supra text accompanying note 120.
132. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatie6, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, art. 34.
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rights. 33
As the Ariana sanctions case itself shows, however, the international
legal community, and perhaps even some of the Summit Seven themselves, have not universally accepted the arguments for application of the
Bonn Declaration independent of the Hague Convention. Both the July
1981 Ottawa Declaration announcing imminent sanctions against Ariana
and the November 30 statement announcing the actual imposition of the
sanctions explicitly linked the Seven's action to Afghan violations of the
Hague Convention."' Whatever the theoretical merits of extending the
Declaration to apply to states not party to the Convention, in practice
the Seven opted to avoid opening up the issue at all. While this may
have been prudent in terms of that particular case, it did set a precedent
that might hinder any future effort to apply the Bonn Declaration beyond the confines of the Hague Convention.
The Ariana sanctions were legally conservative in another respect as
well. The three Summit Seven states that actually had aviation ties with
Afghanistan did nothing to violate the terms of their bilateral civil aviation agreements, such as immediately suspending Ariana's landing rights
conferred under such agreements. Rather, they duly gave notice of termination as such agreements provided for and then simply refused to renew
them once they had terminated. Thus, the question of a legal right to
take countermeasures against a state granting sanctuary to terrorist
skyjackers, where such countermeasures would otherwise violate the
terms of bilateral aviation agreements, did not arise in this case.
When dealing with an instrument as unique as the Bonn Declaration,
however, even the most cautious legal approach does not guarantee freedom from problems. The involvement of third states-i.e., states neither
members of the Seven nor the target of sanctions-in the implementation
of the sanctions is an unavoidable issue. Notwithstanding the predominant position of the Seven in international civil aviation, the participation of other states in any boycott they impose is still very important to
ensure optimal effect. The Seven showed their awareness of this from the
outset; the Bonn Declaration itself concludes with the heads of state and
government "urg[ing] other governments to join them in this commitment." 1 5 Similarly, at the end of the Ottawa Declaration, the Seven
"call upon all states which share their concern for air safety to take ap-

133. See Chamberlain, supra note 78, at 630-631; Busuttil, supra note 116, at 48081.
134. See supra Part IIIB.
135. Bonn Declaration, supra note 29.
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propriate action to persuade Afghanistan to honor its obligations."""6 Indeed, in the Ariana case, it appears that other Western European states,
1 87
at least, honored the boycott.
This does not mean, however, that in cases where-unlike the Ariana
situation-relevant third states had preexisting obligations to grant landing rights to a target state pursuant to bilateral agreements with that
state, they would be willing to violate those obligations for the sake of
solidarity with the Seven. Indeed, the Seven certainly could not ask more
of third states in this regard than they were willing to undertake themselves in the Ariana context. A related and at least equally difficult problem would arise if airlines of a third state, pursuant to a bilateral agreement between that third state and a Summit Seven country, were to
operate services between that Summit Seven country and the target
state-again, not an issue that the Ariana case actually addressed. Pursuant to the Bonn Declaration, such services would also be subject to
termination, even though such termination could violate the agreement
between the third state and the Summit Seven state even without the
justification of responding to an initial violation on the part of the state
whose rights were being so infringed."' Undoubtedly the wish to avoid
such problems motivated in part the Summit Seven governments' efforts
to enlist third states in active support of the Bonn Declaration, efforts
that have met with some success." 9
A separate set of issues are those internal to the Bonn Declaration
itself. Its deceptive simplicity masks a number of potentially vexatious
questions. Even admitting arguendo that the lack of definition of "hijacking" is likely to pose more theoretical than real problems, especially
given the availability of the Hague Convention definition 4 ° for reference, certain other key terms in the Declaration have neither internal
nor dependable external referents. In particular, it is not at all clear
what a "refusal" to extradite or prosecute a hijacker would encompass.
The Ariana case demonstrates that one cannot necessarily confine this
term to situations where, despite the existence of legal jurisdiction and
sufficient evidence, a government explicitly rejects an extradition request
or disavows prosecution-the "terrorist sanctuary and proud of it" paradigm. Indeed, the Afghans' story in the period just before the sanctions
went into force was to the effect that they had every intention of apply-

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Statement on Terrorism, supra note 49.
See Chamberlain, supra note 78.
See Schwenk, supra note 118, at 319-320.
See supra notes 46 and 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.

1987]

INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

ing legal measures to the hijackers, but somehow the latter had vanished
from the country."" Though the Seven and Pakistan found this version
unconvincing, the fact remains that the Afghan authorities were not so
much refusing to extradite or prosecute as they were, one might say,
evading their responsibilities in this regard. While the net result, of
course, is the same, a stance such as the one Afghanistan adopted in this
case does obscure the matter somewhat. The situation has become even
more obscure in light of the mid-1984 report that Afghan authorities had
indeed prosecuted (and for that matter, executed) one of the hijackers-but not for the hijacking.""
Problems such as these are, of course, inherent in legal processes and
the underlying fact situations to which authorities apply those processes.
Legal roadblocks can occur-or be conveniently created. Extradition requests can suddenly develop technical flaws that cause countries to delay
or reject them. Evidence can be difficult to obtain, particularly if authorities are not looking very hard for it. Criminal defendants can disappear
or die. And information that reaches the outside about what is happening in all these areas can be scarce, undependable, and contradictory. In
other words, the real world is probably not going to fit very comfortably
into the simple model of "refus[ing] extradition or prosecution" envisioned in the words of the Bonn Declaration. This does not mean that
the Bonn Declaration cannot be implemented; it does mean that to implement it meaningfully, a decision-making process capable of assessing
complex legal and factual variables (and, of course, political factors as
well), and acting on them, must exist. Though full analysis of such a
process is beyond the scope of this Article, the present discussion demonstrates once again that-particularly when it comes to a problem as sensitive and complex as international counterterrorism cooperation-making declarations is one thing; carrying them out is a far more
difficult matter.

141.
142.

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See The Times (London), supra note 108 and accompanying text.

